Poster No:
797
Submission Type:
Abstract Submission
Authors:
Kalliopi Ioumpa1, Emilie Caspar2, Valeria Gazzola3, Christian Keysers3
Institutions:
1Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, 2Ghent University, Ghent , Belgium, 3The Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, KNAW research institute, Amsterdam, Amsterdam
First Author:
Co-Author(s):
Valeria Gazzola
The Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, KNAW research institute
Amsterdam, Amsterdam
Christian Keysers
The Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, KNAW research institute
Amsterdam, Amsterdam
Introduction:
Fractioning operations between several individuals along a hierarchical chain is commonly found in the way organizations function. A superior communicates a plan and a subordinate executes it. The superior then has responsibility for the decision but is distanced from the outcomes, while the subordinate experiences authorship over the action but reduced responsibility for its outcomes (Bandura, 2006). As the superiors are often following instructions themselves, they also end up in intermediary roles. Experimental research has shown that this fractioning allows diffusing responsibility between components of the chain, which can disinhibit the commission of actions that harm others (Kilham & Mann, 1974; Milgram, 1974). However, the neural mechanisms by which being in the intermediary or commanding position disinhibit harming others remains largely unknown. Here we conducted two studies, one using fMRI and one using EEG, to investigate how commanding or being in an intermediary position impacts the sense of agency and the processing of victim's pain. In the age of military drones, we also explored whether commanding a human or robot agent influences these processes. Finally we compared these results with results obtained from a study on agents, directly harming a victim (Caspar & Ioumpa et al., 2020).
Methods:
Forty participants were tested in the fMRI study (13males; 25.05 y±3.6SD) using a 3-Tesla Philips Ingenia CX system. Forty-eight participants were tested in the EEG study (24males; 23.9 y±3.9SD) with a 64-channel electrode cap. In both studies, participants were recruited in pairs and respectively played the role of the person giving orders or the role of the 'victim'. When they were giving orders, participants had to give an order to an agent to send or not to send a real, mildly painful electric shock to the 'victim' in exchange for a small monetary gain. In that position, participants were either free to decide which order to send to the agents (were 'commanders') or were given an order by the experimenter that they had to transmit to the agent (were 'intermediaries'). When participants were in the commander position, we also modulated the entity executing their orders: they were either giving orders to another human or to a non-humanoid robot. Sense of agency was additionally measured in the EEG study through the intentional binding effect (Moore & Haggard, 2010). Participants had to estimate the duration of the time interval between pressing the button to transmit an order to the agent and its consequence (shock or no shock) and shorter time estimates indicate a stronger sense of agency.
Results:
EEG results showed that the neural response over P3, which is sensitive to the observation of pain in others (Coll, 2018), was higher when the executing agent was a robot compared to a human. Source reconstruction of the EEG signal revealed that this effect was mediated by areas including the insula and ACC. The sense of agency did not differ between commanders and intermediaries, no matter if the executing agent was a robot or a human. fMRI results comparing commanders and agents, revealed that activation in social cognition and empathy-related brain regions as IFG, IPL and SII was equally low when witnessing a victim receiving a painful shock when participants were commander or intermediary transmitting an order, and both were lower compared to being the agent directly delivering the shock to harm the victim.
Conclusions:
Summarizing, being a commander or intermediary seemed to reduce processing the pain of the victim compared to being the agent directly administering the pain. Commanding a human agent led to reduced responsibility and activation compared to commanding a robot agent but there were no differences in the sense of agency levels. These results shed some more light on how hierarchical situations can facilitate the commission of actions that harm others as responsibility and empathy are reduced and split across multiple individuals.
Emotion, Motivation and Social Neuroscience:
Social Cognition 1
Higher Cognitive Functions:
Decision Making 2
Modeling and Analysis Methods:
Activation (eg. BOLD task-fMRI)
EEG/MEG Modeling and Analysis
Perception, Attention and Motor Behavior:
Perception: Pain and Visceral
Keywords:
Cognition
Electroencephaolography (EEG)
Emotions
FUNCTIONAL MRI
Pain
Social Interactions
1|2Indicates the priority used for review
Provide references using author date format
Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a Psychology of Human Agency. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(2), 164–180.
Caspar, E. A. & Ioumpa, K. (2020). Obeying orders reduces vicarious brain activation towards victims’ pain. NeuroImage, 222, 117251.
Coll, M. P. (2018). Meta-analysis of ERP investigations of pain empathy underlines methodological issues in ERP research. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 13(10), 1003-1017.
Kilham, W., & Mann, L. (1974). Level of destructive obedience as a function of transmitter and executant roles in the Milgram obedience paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29(5), 696–702.
Milgram, S. (1974). The Dilemma of Obedience. The Phi Delta Kappan, 55(9), 603–606.